Abstract Over the past 30 years, responding to different international, political and economic circumstances, populists have formed, preserved, nurtured and expanded a political identity that is today present in most political systems in Europe. This identity constitutes a 'populist potential', in the sense that it is nonideological and that it wavers between electoral abstention and support for antisystem parties. This essay provides a historical overview of the ideological and sociological evolution of the populist identity in Europe and reviews the ways parties of the centre-right have dealt with it in the past. Its conclusion is that practices like coalition building and theme co-optation are not so easy to deploy today, given the non-ideological and anti-system nature of the populist potential.
Introduction
This article will provide a short historical account of the rise and success of populism over the past four decades in order to distil some conclusions about the persistence and the nature of the populist challenge. It will argue that most European societies today are characterised by the existence of a 'populist potential', a significant part of the electorate that encompasses voters who actively subscribe to a populist, anti-establishment ideological identity together with voters who have stepped out of the party system altogether. This populist potential is energised by different discourses, takes many shapes and combines references to authoritarian ideological heritages with an ever-growing antipolitical ethos. This article will argue that this populist potential is today a permanent fixture. It will also argue that, among moderate parties, the centreright in particular has been the most effective in countering the populist challenge. Today however, the centre-right's strategic position is both privileged and precarious, a function of its sustained strength within a political system that is rapidly losing collective legitimacy.
Phase 1, 1980s: the new radical right rises, the populist potential materialises
There were outbursts of populist politics in the post-war period in Western Europe, but they were swiftly contained under the weight of robust party systems that performed fairly well the basic functions of party democracy (mobilisation, incorporation and representation of interests, and the recruitment and training of political elites). This was the golden age of party politics, when political parties represented political identities mobilised around a few dominant dimensions of opposition or cleavages (Bartolini and Mair 1990) . This era came to a close in the 1980s, when a new crop of populist politicians, with roots in the far right authoritarian tradition of Western European politics, made their appearance.
This new radical right represented the effort of the heirs of discredited authoritarian traditions to update their image and message at times of newly encountered economic hardship. Jean-Marie Le Pen, leader of the National Front (Front National, FN) in France, and Jörg Haider, leader of the Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ), were the most successful and persistent exponents of a populism that targeted corrupted elites and immigrants as responsible for a perceived economic and moral crisis. This ethnic populism was an updating of old far right traditions, of course, but the policy message was still unique because it was adapted to new social conditions. The new radical right responded to a perceived breakdown of authority and social order, thus attracting primarily people with an outlook that combined cultural authoritarianism and a sense of economic insecurity (Minkenberg 2000) . In response to their needs, the new radical right's populism combined a pronounced anti-immigrant discourse with a vocal neo-liberal populism, thus creating what political scientist Herbert Kitschelt had called 'the winning formula' of the populist right (Kitschelt 1995) .
In terms of outlook, the new radical right of the 1980s could be seen as a radicalised wing of the broad conservative family. Its following was mostly middle class, albeit the part of the middle class that felt most vulnerable economically and culturally. Nevertheless, it also signalled a qualitative change in party competition in Western Europe in that its ethnic populism was particularly mobilised against New Left demands (about minorities, personal lifestyles and so on). While this radicalisation of a cultural axis of competition, pitting authoritarians versus social liberals, was still subsumed under the traditional socioeconomic left-right divide, the radical right had carved out a political area characterised by economic and cultural alienation, a veritable new political identity energised by an anti-establishment, yet still quite ideological, populism (Minkenberg 2000) . opposition to the weakening of the nation state (Taggart 1998) . Concurrently, these parties' anti-elite populism was underpinned by the popular perception that, in an integrated Europe and a globalised world, there are few things elected governments can do. In this context, traditional political identities began to erode, but populists of the right could hold their own by subsuming anti-establishment themes into a loose political milieu whose core was still authoritarianconservative but whose veneer was attracting more and more newcomers.
During the 1990s, anti-immigrant and anti-elite discourses remained the staple of the new radical right but crucial elements in its outlook began to change. In various countries (notably France and Austria) right-wing populists began to attract the support of people from beyond the core of the authoritarian middleclass right. The radical right maintained the main elements of its laissez faire economics, yet it started making inroads into the working-class and youth vote by overcompensating on issues of law and order, sovereignty and cultural-ethnic alienation. The populist potential was still anchored on the right, but its membership was becoming sociologically varied and ideologically diffuse, with principled far right orthodoxy giving way to a general discontent with politics as the glue of the coalition (Mayer 2002) . The entry of Haider's FPÖ into the Austrian government in 2000 marks the apex of this period.
Phase 3, 2000s: identity politics meets protectionism
By the early 2000s mainstream parties seemed to have converged to a point of acceptance of the basic tenets of economic and cultural openness (Kriesi et al. 2006, 926) . Increasingly, the populist potential was losing its character as an authoritarian offshoot of the right wing. Radical right populists aligned their rhetoric more and more to the emerging cleavage between globalisation's winners and losers. For heirs to old authoritarian traditions in France and Austria, this meant an exit from their comfort zone of vulnerable middle-class authoritarianism. The targeting of immigrants and law and order was combined with an ever more protectionist discourse on economic matters. It is not to be denied that the defining parameter of the populist potential in these countries remained culturally and ethnically authoritarian (Kriesi et al. 2006, 929) . But populist leaders became much more explicit in their courting of the parts of the population that tangibly felt the externalities of economic openness (Azmanova 2011) . Programmatically, this meant that by the mid-2000s the FN and the FPÖ had shed their neo-liberalism (Bornschier 2011, 40) , something that facilitated the amazing inroads both parties made into the working class vote, as well as their ability to mobilise people otherwise disenchanted with politics altogether (Knapp 2004 The economic crisis in Europe marks important points of continuity and change in the development of the populist potential. In terms of continuity, it supplies populist politicians who were already strongly anti-elitist, Eurosceptic and protectionist with the opportunity to intensify these themes with the aim of capturing a bigger share of an electorate that is increasingly disenchanted with politics. In terms of change, it signifies a moment of crisis of such magnitude that the very essence of liberal representative democracy is challenged.
Elections in the eurozone since 2010 testify to the fact that the populist potential now constitutes an identity mobilised primarily by opposition to mainstream parties as such. Reflecting the radical right's essential role in its initial formulation, the populist potential still exhibits a strong cultural protectionism. Yet in the current context this cultural component merges with a strong anti-elite and economically protectionist discourse to form a coherent anti-system message whose expression is only vaguely modified according to the ideological tradition of this or that leader. It seemed that in countries with both right-wing and left-wing populist parties, the two sides were competing as much in unison against the centre as they were between themselves to capture the same target audience that was experiencing middle-class disappointment, working-class alienation and youth exclusion. This was the case in 2012 with elections in France, the Netherlands and Greece. In Finland, on the other hand, the euro itself became an issue that allowed the emergence of a populist party advancing Eurosceptic and protectionist themes in 2011. and the mistakes the ruling political class makes. In all these cases, there is little space for constructive engagement or coalition making: opposition to the system is the essence of the populist potential, and populists want to be sure that discontent is channelled in their favour in elections instead of feeding abstention.
Apart from coalition making, the co-opting of themes by the centre-right is also much more difficult than before. First, populists today are almost totally given to a protectionist economic discourse. While cultural conservatism was easier to coopt for Christian Democratic and conservative parties, it is impossible for these parties to pre-empt protectionism and Euroscepticism without losing credibility.
Second, and most important, in an integrated eurozone facing huge imbalances and tension between creditors and debtors, co-optation of populist themes in one country inescapably has repercussions elsewhere. Unfortunately, cultural values are diffuse and intangible; they can be shared, traded or altered virtually. But economic resources, unlike values, are finite. Laying claim to a resource, unlike a value, means that someone else will have less of it. At least inside the eurozone, mainstream parties function under very tight constraints. They cannot be seen to give in too much to their creditors (or debtors) before populists at home start to rise up, yet catering to populist sentiments at home feeds discontent on the other side of the creditor-debtor divide.
Conclusion: no easy way out-but a way nonetheless
If one observes the political landscape in Europe, one will see that the centre- Under these circumstances, forcing populists to share in government responsibilities is difficult (either because their demands are completely new and, so far, non-absorbable, or because their populism is so non-ideological and antisystem that entering government would be a negation of their existence), and coopting their demands causes strains in the management of the European project.
However, if we understand the nature of the populist potential as a breeding ground of a new cultural authoritarianism that combines mistrust of representative institutions with opposition to economic openness, as I do in this article, we can at least begin to conceive of ways outside of partisan tactics to, if not counter the electoral rise of populists, at least make the democratic game itself more appealing.
Perhaps the main conclusion to draw from this analysis is that today's populist potential is mobilised less by specific ideological grievances than by a general discontent with democratic politics as such. This is unfortunate but it contains some seeds of opportunity. It potentially lays the burden not so much on an immediate delivery of policy outputs that are difficult and complicated to achieve (for example, drastic improvement of the economic climate), but on the creation of structures, institutions and practices that at least invite renewed popular participation and facilitate social input in policymaking processes.
Politicians of mainstream parties understandably raise objections against measures that could bring about sub-optimal results, such as referenda, or that decrease the overall degree of experience possessed by political personnel, such as term limits for members of parliament. Yet considering these and other measures that will signal to electorates new mechanisms for participation and will increase the responsiveness of elites to societal demands is a relatively cheap way to renew the compact between societies and politics in Europe. It may not satisfy the urge of the populist potential for easy solutions 'right here, right now', but it will at least effectively counter the ongoing transformation of public discontent with party politics into authoritarian anti-political (and, potentially, antidemocratic) projects.
